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There are several interconnected issues raised by Loïc Wacquant’s work which reflect 
not only general sociological and criminological concerns, but also pertain to specific 
areas of debate, including the function of imprisonment, the notion of illicit markets, 
the interpretation of violence, the concept of collective action and the new ways of 
superseding neo-liberal philosophies.  
   In an analysis of the continuity between the prison and the ghetto, Wacquant (2001) 
argues that both host a surplus population, the human waste discarded by the 
productive system and ignored by the welfare state. The growth of these two 
receptacles of marginality, he remarks, is not a response to growing crime, but to 
growing poverty, not a reaction to criminal insecurity, but to social insecurity: in 
brief, the war against poverty has turned into war against the poor. An expansion of 
this analysis is found in the more recent Punishing the Poor (Wacquant, 2009), where 
the author discusses how the current workfare philosophies are intertwined with the 
retrenchment of inclusive assistance and policies, and the expansion of custodial 
punishment. The control of the economically disadvantaged is thus described as a 
result of fear and resentment on the part of the better-off, a reassertion of institutional 
strength, an outmoded exhibition of the moralizing role of the state. Warehouses for 
the dispossessed, prisons testify to a politics of ‘class cleansing’ implemented against 
undesirable populations and neighbourhoods whose very existence may be disturbing, 
hence the urge to make them coercively disappear. What makes the prison system 
different today, according to Wacquant, is that ‘it does not carry out a positive 
economic mission of recruitment and disciplining an active workforce. The prison 
serves mainly to warehouse the precarious and deproletarianized fractions of the black 
working class in the dualizing city’ (ibid: 208). Is then the growth of custodial 
penalties a mere reflection of the decline of the welfare state and the criminalization 
of marginality?  
   We have two distinct issues here, the former relating to the punishment of social 
insecurity rather than criminal insecurity, the latter pertaining to the manifest or latent 
function of punishment itself. What follows may add to Wacquant’s analysis while 
suggesting a slight change in the focus of theoretical inquiry. 
 
The criminalisation of indolence 
 
One would assume that with the phrase ‘social insecurity’, Wacquant intends to 
convey a notion of social disorder which is constructed in particular ways around 
certain groups, and widely used to serve certain particular interests. The appeal to 
‘social disorder’ may contribute to mobilising despair as a political weapon rather 
than demands for justice. Appropriated by powerful groups, and turned into fear, it 
reflects, reshapes and reinforces the status quo (Shirlow and Pain, 2003). In common 
understandings ‘social disorder’ is associated with behaviour involving potentially 
threatening strangers (Sampson, 2009) like in Wacquant’s elaboration ‘social 
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insecurity’ is linked with marginalisation and poverty. In other words, punishment is 
disjointed from the potential criminal nature of the threat experienced and is aimed at 
specific categories of feared individuals. In this respect, Wacquant’s analysis might 
benefit from some supplementary observations about ‘human waste’ and the 
perception of certain groups as troublesome. The emphasis, however, can be placed 
on useless people who fail to act as consumers. My proposed change of focus, in other 
words, sets off with the hypothesis that what is feared and punished is less the 
criminal capacity of these groups than their indolence, and specifically their absence 
from markets and their relative deprivation (Ruggiero, 2010a). Let us see some 
precedents to this analysis. 
   In the words of Walter Benjamin (1999), market economies display a pure cult of 
the useful. It is inevitable, therefore, that uselessness is associated with disorder. 
Markets enact a constant, dreamless, celebration involving consumers as relentless 
adorers: they take on the traits of a religion. Grown as parasites of Christianity, 
market economies keep the essence of parasitic systems at their chore, while 
incorporating new types of religion. By absorbing the ‘juice’ of religion, they replace 
religious authority, managed by clerical apparatuses, with economic authority, 
managed by anonymous powers which are just as sacred. These systems are 
victorious less because they are superior than for their ‘cult of possession’. According 
to Benjamin, the opening hours of shops remind one of liturgical calendars, in a cult 
which is more concrete and imperative than its religious counterpart (Gaeta, 2008). 
   Sure, such systems are never completely accomplished, but they will be in the 
coming kingdom of universal wellbeing. Here, the mixture of secular and 
transcendental order is decisive: the kingdom of God will only come with the total 
dominion of the economic sphere. As a preliminary suggestion, I would like to note 
that this obtuse faith in progress still affects the perceptions of order and disorder in 
contemporary societies. Productive activities and consumption remain today the only 
signs of social health and acceptable order. Even the concept of antisocial behaviour, 
and Wacquant’s ‘social insecurity’, in the last analysis, might be associated with 
indolence and failure to play a role in the marketplace.   
    Social insecurity and disorder, therefore, signal unproductive lifestyles and 
absenteeism from markets. Wacquant’s idea that punitive measures make poverty 
disappear echoes Lefebvre’s (2003) critique of cities which prevent the constitution of 
a group, of a subject: it is not a coincidence, Lefebvre remarks, that whenever 
threatened, the first thing power restricts is the ability to linger or assemble in the 
street. If not devoted to consumption and the celebration of the powerful, conquerors 
and death, then streets have to be stripped of their political potential, and turned into 
‘blind fields’, areas that we resist, turn away from, and struggle against. Areas of 
disorder. This was the character of Haussmann’s urbanism, that ‘gutted Paris 
according to plan and deported the proletariat to the periphery of the city’ (ibid: 109). 
Social order became governed by ‘straight lines, alignment and geometric 
perspective’, more suitable for the intervention of the army called upon to confront 
the crowd.  Social order, in sum, expresses itself through the void: ‘empty space, 
broad avenues, plazas of gigantic proportion open to spectacular processions’ (ibid). 
Fear steps in when spaces are populated. What is important to note, here, is that the 
perception of disorder leads to processes aimed at making the street apolitical, that is 
to the creation and perpetuation of social enclaves banned from shaping the urban.  
The urban community is the result of collective action by social agents, subjects 
acting in successive thrusts, ‘discontinuously releasing and fashioning layers of 
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space’. Social groups, while acting with and/or against one another, forge the qualities 
and properties of urban space. Excluded groups are not allowed to create space.  
 
‘The merchant bourgeoisie, the intellectuals, and politicians modelled the city. 
The industrialists demolished it. The working class never had any space other 
than that of its expropriation, its deportation: segregation’ (ibid: 128).  
 
Excluded groups are expected to populate the other place, the place of the other, the 
place of`anomie. This is Lefebvre’s concept of heterotopy, which should be 
assimilated to a notion of chaos, formlessness, a menacing site that can explode, 
whether or not such a possibility is realistic. Wacquant may want to recognise that 
this process precedes and attends to the disappearance of poverty he hypothesises. 
 
The fear of relative deprivation 
 
We are facing a paradox: excluded from the market and its religion, materially denied 
the opportunities to develop a form of loyalty for ‘controlled consumption’, banned 
from collective formulations of political uses of the street, marginalised groups are 
expected to express a social sensibility that has been taken away from them. That such 
groups are automatically assimilated to ideas of chaos and disorder is not surprising, 
because these ideas provide an explanation of a social issue that would otherwise 
remain ‘unknown’. There is a need to make sense of ‘urban disorder’ and ‘diversity’. 
Nietzsche (1968) suggests that in turning something which is unknown into 
something which is known we feel a sense of lightness and power. The unknown is 
dangerous, disquieting, worrying, and our instinct tends to suppress it: any 
explanation is better than no explanation. In the past, hostile beings, ‘nasty spirits’ and 
hysterical women were mistaken for devils and witches, and yet this infamous 
mistake brought the pleasure of a spiritual discovery, of truth. Enemies, in other 
words, were ‘spiritualized’, so that they could confer legitimacy upon inquisitors.  
The translation of the unknown into the known produces righteousness; stigmatisation 
provides a rational escape from chaos, while disorder is strongly associated to the 
presumed indolence characterising groups on the margins.  
   It is also worth noting some aspects of the relationship between perceptions of 
disorder and inequality. The idea of urban disorder emerges with the very birth of the 
urban, and accompanies the whole history of sociological thought. However, the 
demand for order increases in periods in which the demand for political participation 
declines, as if by removing the signs of marginalisation the social problems connected 
to it could be eliminated. In such periods, concerns about disorder find unwitting 
support in criminological theories, particularly theories hinging on notions of 
disadvantage. I am thinking of concepts such as ‘relative deprivation’, according to 
which many disadvantaged people, when surrounded by the wealth they cannot reach, 
feel that they have a right to portions of it. Hence their alleged or potential 
engagement in illicit activity, the official means for achieving wealth being denied to 
them. It would be worth investigating whether such concepts have by now gained 
currency even among the police and the judiciary who, predicting that the condition of 
disadvantage inevitably leads to crime, respectively arrest and convict the 
marginalised, because sooner or later they will be forced to do so anyway. If this is 
the case, growing perceptions of disorder or insecurity are the result of parallel 
perceptions that social injustice is reaching dangerous levels: what is feared is not 
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disorder or crime, but the potential consequences of astonishingly increases in 
inequality.  
 
The function of custodial punishment 
 
Punishing poverty may be a sadistic way of inflicting pain on those already suffering 
from a painful social condition. This is not, of course, what Wacquant argues, 
although the function he attributes to the prison system in general remains unclear. He 
does stress that the punitive turn cannot be simply explained with the shift from a 
traditional industrial mode of production to a flexible post-Fordist system of work. In 
his view, there is a specific efficacy in the symbolic power of punishment that purely 
materialistic analyses may fail to account for. His view that punishment does not 
perfom an economic mission in terms of forging and disciplining sectors of the labour 
market has already been mentioned. But to sum up his analysis, the penal state is said 
to perform a number of complementary tasks: warehousing the surplus population, 
keeping the marginalised in the condition of labouring poor, and reassuring the fearful 
middle classes (De Giorgi, 2010). It may be useful, in this respect, to locate 
Wacquant’s analysis within a framework of ‘cultures of punishment’ with which 
sociologists and criminologists are familiar. Les us start with some classics. 
   By becoming citizens human beings acquire dignity. But there are exceptions: 
dignity is lost by citizens who commit crime, which makes them mere tools of state 
choices (Kant, 1996). Crime makes an individual a bondsman, a servus in sensu 
stricto, the property of the state. The penal state, as examined by Wacquant, seems to 
incorporate this Kantian notion: rulers have the right to punish wrongdoers or, to 
avoid any equivocation, to ‘inflict pain upon them’. Kant does not hide his views 
behind periphrases, nor does he share the awe with which penal reformers look at the 
concept of rehabilitation. Punishment means inflicting pain and can never be used as a 
means to ‘promote some other good for the criminal himself or for civil society’. 
Rehabilitation, instead, implies that a human being is treated ‘merely as a means to 
the purposes of another’ (ibid: 104). Punishment is the logical consequence of a 
conduct that the rulers define as crime: it is a categorical imperative. 
   While for Kant we should avoid being infected by pain and leave the sovereign 
exercise the right to punish, in Hegel it is offenders who have a right to be punished. 
For Hegel, crime and punishment constitute a single category; wrong in itself carries 
the presuppositions and the necessity for a moral emendation disguised beyond a legal 
repressive measure. In sum, Hegel sees wrong and the institutional responses to it as a 
single whole, as interwoven components of a discrete notion. Against reformers who 
advocate punishment only if its beneficial effects can be proven, he retorts, first, that 
punishment need not be useful, and second, that it need not be deterrent, because this 
would imply that offenders are not free individuals. Deterrence threatens people, be 
they offenders or otherwise, as if they were dogs, which we menace by raising a stick. 
Punishment based solely on such a ground is itself a form of wrong, because it does 
not contain any respectful vision of the people addressed, their rationality and their 
personality (Hegel, 1952).  
   It is difficult to determine whether the symbolic function of custody Wacquant 
attributes to the expanding penal state contains some of these idealistic elements, in 
other words, whether his analysis is suggesting that contemporary punitiveness marks 
the return to sacred visions of authority. If this is the case, Wacquant would find also 
in Durkheim a source of inspiration. Durkheim turns Hegel upside down: it is not the 
intrinsic nature of an act that produces the ensuing punishment, it is the fact that the 
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act violates a rule. Conducts which cause identical material consequences may be 
‘blamed or not blamed according to whether or not there is a rule forbidding them’ 
(Durkheim, 1974: 43). Durkheim accompanies this argument, which contains an ante 
litteram element of labelling theory, with the observation that there is no strong 
relationship between the harm caused by an act and the intensity of the institutional 
response to it. For example, in the penal law of most societies, murder is regarded as 
the greatest of crimes. However, he argues, an economic crisis or stock-market crash 
can disorganise the social body more severely than an isolated homicide. ‘No doubt 
murder is always an evil, but there is no proof that it is the greatest of evils. What is 
one man less to society? What does one lost cell matter to the organism?’ (Durkheim, 
1960: 72). In the elaboration of Wacquant individuals do not have to violate a rule to 
be punished, unless by rule we mean a conformist life style totally devoted to 
producing and consuming. Also in Durkheim, however, punishment is not meant to 
respond to evil, but only to vent our instinct of vengeance upon those we regard as 
morally outrageous: ‘Punishment, thus, remains for us what it was for our fathers. It is 
still an act of vengeance. What we avenge is the outrage to morality’ (Durkheim, 
1960: 86-89). Put differently, we inflict various degrees of suffering and hardship on 
offenders, not because we may benefit in a material sense from it, but to mark the 
moral strength of a message we intend to convey (Garland, 1990). Punishment, then, 
is not for offenders, but is a means for boosting the common moral order, the 
conscience collective. It reassures and regenerates the righteousness of the law-
abiding community, whilst also meeting out in legally sanitised fashion our need for 
revenge (Ruggiero, 2003; 2010b).  
   All of this may help locate Wacquant’s analysis of the symbolic function of 
punishment, particularly his view that the penal state performs the task of reassuring 
groups and classes that the moral fabric of society is effectively protected. As for his 
assertion that punishment does not perform a significant economic mission, some 
clarification is necessary if we are to fully understand his interpretation. 
   Broadly distinguishing critical approaches to the analysis of punishment, two 
extreme positions can be observed: the former emphasises the institutional function of 
imprisonment, while the latter stresses its material function. The first is embedded in 
the notion of retribution and, in its extreme manifestations, addresses imprisonment as 
a means for the destruction of bodies. The second looks at prison as a regulatory tool 
and mainly focuses on the productive use of bodies. Of course, analyses adopting a 
mixed approach are numerous, but for the sake of clarity here the two positions will 
be kept theoretically and empirically separate. Founding, celebrated, theorists of the 
respective approaches are Rusche and Kirchheimer (1968) on the one hand, and 
Michel Foucault (1977) on the other. However, if we are to draw a complete 
theoretical map, an additional element should be added. Cotemporary prison systems, 
for example, can be identified as a synthesis of the institutional and the material 
function. Although the former seems to be prevailing, the latter is far from having 
become redundant. The institutional function is undergoing a technical evolution and 
manifests itself in the metaphorical annihilation of those prisoners who are deemed 
impervious to treatment. The material function, in turn, is also undergoing wide 
modification. We can still employ the term ‘material’ because it conjures up a notion 
of productivity, but suggest that it should not be assimilated to the notion of the 
workhouse nor with that of ‘prison as factory’ of early capitalism (Melossi and 
Pavarini, 1977). Prisoners’ work and exploitation mainly take place beyond the prison 
walls, notably in those social areas where marginalised activities and precarious jobs 
intermingle with overtly illegal activities. We could term these areas carceral social 
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zones to which a variety of forms of control and punishment are addressed, including, 
when softer forms prove unsuccessful, the threat of physical and mental destruction. 
In such areas, the general and individual deterrent roles of punishment are not only 
directed to repeat or unmanageable offenders but also to the excluded populations in 
general (Ruggiero, 2010b).  
   Carceral social zones, that elsewhere I have described as bazaars (Ruggiero, 2000), 
host a mixture of official and illegal activities, and witness a constant flow of 
commodities and service delivery whose nature may be legal or otherwise. In such 
areas, ‘crime as work’ means that poorly-paid regular work, unregistered jobs, 
underemployment and criminal activity proper are not part of a definitive 
occupational choice. In them, people ‘commute’ from one activity to the other, and in 
doing so expose themselves to the institutional as well as the material aspect of 
punishment. To remark that those inhabiting these areas are met with increasingly 
punitive measures is to provide a partial picture of the relationship between 
punishment and the material condition of those punished. In other words, the concept 
of repression is insufficient (Wacquant, 2008a), as it leaves out the ‘educational’ 
content of state intervention. If we attempted to test Rusche’s and Kirchheimer’s 
model of interpretation to the carceral social zones, enormous problems would arise, 
in that such zones do not display the conventional traits of labour markets, nor do they 
show neat distinctions between employment and unemployment.. Even if we decided 
to adopt a ‘long cycle’ or ‘long wave’ of , respectively, economic development and 
incarceration (Melossi, 2003), problems would remain, because in the carceral social 
zone, unemployment, semi-employment, underemployment and illegal work co-exist, 
at times in the same person. On the other hand, it has to be stressed that the 
educational or material function of punishment, in these areas, do not cease to be 
exercised. The marginalised, the underemployed, the occasional workers, the petty 
criminals and all the others whose lifestyle and economic activity straddle legality and 
illegality are ‘trained’ to remain and survive in their areas of exclusion, like its 
counterpart in the past centuries was trained to the discipline of industrialism. Prison 
discipline aims at lowering their social expectations, an aspect that leads us back to 
the concept of rehabilitation so spurned by German idealist philosophers. Prisoners 
are deemed rehabilitated when they accept to remain in that specific sector of the 
labour force and inhabit the carceral zone assigned to them. This ‘criminal’ labour 
force and the adjacent marginalised labour force constitute the repository of the prison 
population, the human reserve upon which custody, with its diverse degrees of 
harshness and rehabilitative rhetoric, projects its shadow. 
    
The economy of the outcasts 
 
Returning to the continuity between the prison and the ghetto, another contribution by 
Wacquant deserves to be reviewed. His Urban Outcasts is a passionate study of 
ghettoes and banlieus, of their moral and material economy, and of the relationships 
between the growth of such enclaves and recent, general, politico-economic 
developments. Perceived as lawless zones, at times as no-go wild districts, such urban 
areas appear to be characterised, at first sight, by a uniform degree and quality of 
destitution, violence and despair. Wacquant’s (2008b) comparative study of 
‘advanced marginality’ remarks that these territories of deprivation, owing to the halo 
of danger and dread that enshrouds them, are typically depicted in monochrome tones. 
His is an attempt to show how urban marginality, instead, takes different forms 
related to space and state intervention and according to the class characteristics found 
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in specific contexts and epochs. He focuses on the American Black Belt and the 
French Red Belt (the peripheral working class areas that were the traditional 
stronghold of the Left). In both places social life may appear equally chaotic and 
brutish, but only in the former does socio-spatial relegation assume the traits of a 
hyperghetto, nor is it appropriate to regard such a distinct configuration of marginality 
as the inevitable destiny of European exclusionary areas. The US hyperghetto, we are 
told, is an amalgam of racial discrimination, class inequality and state inaction, where 
the retrenchment of the welfare state and the shrinking of occupational opportunities 
are compensated by intensive police activity and the constant threat of the penal 
apparatus.  
   The declining urban peripheries of European cities and the African-American 
ghettoes could be therefore described as two distinct socio-spatial formations, 
produced by different institutional logics of segregation. Higher levels of isolation and 
hardship are found in the US, where exclusion is said to mainly operate on the basis 
of race and compounded by public neglect. Conversely, marginalisation in European 
cities is supposed to be arranged around the variable class, but also tempered by state 
intervention. In brief, while the American hyperghetto is depicted as an ethnically and 
socially homogeneous universe, characterised by extreme levels of physical and social 
insecurity, European urban peripheries are seen as heterogeneous urban settings 
where isolation is mitigated by the strong presence of public institutions. 
   But what is a hyperghetto? We may compare it with previous forms of exclusion 
and marginalisation. The ‘communal ghetto’, for example, was a ‘sharply 
circumscribed socio-spatial formation’ inhabited by black people from all classes, 
while the hyperghetto is a socio-geographical entity segregated on the basis of race 
and class. The communal ghetto of the immediate post-war years was bounded by a 
unifying collective consciousness and shared values and aspirations which could be 
displayed in periodical moments of mobilisation. The distinction between place and 
space is, in this regard, very useful. While the old ghettoes were places, therefore 
fixed and stable social sites, hyperghettoes are spaces, namely areas of potential 
threat, to be feared or fled. In sum, the new ghetto is new because its population 
suffers from more severe relative deprivation, and because it lacks the organisational 
infrastructure and the associational networks that gave the ghetto of the 1950s its 
communal character and strength, making it a place of collective solidarity and 
potential mobilization. 
  Some reference to the work of Lefebvre (1968), again, may be useful here. 
Collective consciousness, shared values and mobilisation are seen by Lefebvre as 
expressions of ‘love’ for the city, whereby groups elaborate a strategy aimed to re-
plan the urban environment. Such ‘love’ coincides with the right to the city, which the 
authorities slowly reduce to the right to housing. The result is the habitat in its purest 
form, a habitat burdened with restraints. The notion of habitat excludes that of 
inhabit, that is ‘the plasticity of space, its modelling and the appropriation by groups 
and individuals of the conditions of their existence’ (ibid: 79). Old ghettoes, one may 
suggest, incorporate the concept of ‘the right to urban life’, namely the right to use the 
city as a place of encounter, where the underprivileged ‘appear on all the networks 
and circuits of communication, information and exchange’ (ibid: 80). However, while 
Wacquant’s distinction between place and space echoes that of Lefebvre between 
habitat and inhabit, their explanation of the shift from the former to the latter appears 
to be completely opposite. In Lefebvre, such shift results from local and national 
institutions responding to contestation and demands by entering the ghetto, whereas in 
Wacquant it is caused by authorities abandoning it. In this way, the old ghetto, 
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characterised by shared emotions, joint meanings and institutions of mutuality, is 
turned into an hyperghetto, characterised by mere survival.  
 
‘In the final analysis, however, it is the collapse of public institutions, 
resulting from state policies of urban abandonment and leading to the punitive 
containment of the black sub-proletariat, that emerges as the most potent and 
most distinctive cause of entrenched marginality in the American metropolis’ 
(Wacquant, 2008b: 4).  
 
Here, it is worth highlighting a controversial issue revolving around two contrasting 
ways of analysing the role of institutional agencies. On the one hand, we have a view 
of agencies as organisms which distil, select, distort demands, and offer surrogate 
‘social goods’ to those requesting genuine ones (Lefebvre). On the other hand, we 
have views of agencies as authorities practicing social absenteeism, thus totally 
ignoring demands. 
 
A functioning disorganisation 
 
From Wacquant’s description it is not easy to evince whether between urban outcasts 
and the official society there is any meaningful relationship, or to put it in different 
terms, whether the values adopted by excluded groups and those embraced by 
dominant ones are totally extraneous to one another. It is my contention that there is 
an ambivalent and contradictory nature in excluded and ostracised communities.  
   The separation of the ghetto from the official society is only apparent, and there are 
strong ties uniting the two in a number of ways. One such tie, for example, pertains to 
the structural transformation of the ghetto and the changes taking place in the 
economy. While the ghetto, therefore, may be ‘an institutional form, that is, a 
distinctive, spatially based, concatenation of mechanisms of ethno-racial closure and 
control’, it is also a territory providing ‘a protective buffer against the dominant 
institutions of the encompassing society’ (Wacquant, 2008b: 49). This formulation 
mainly revolves around the variables isolation, exclusion, protective withdrawal from 
institutional control. In other elaborations, however, other variables could be 
introduced that transcend the sheer relationship between controllers and controlled. 
Ghettoes perform specific functions within the broader metropolitan system. Some 
districts may be repositories of the contemporary version of nineteenth-century 
rabble, the hordes of ‘unproductive thugs’ who will not and cannot be turned into 
labourers. Others may be containers of despicable groups segregated less for their 
lack of productive capacity than for the hatred their race elicits. Finally, some districts 
may act as reservoirs of low-skill labour force. Note the ambivalence: ghettoes are 
inhabited by disposable but usable people, rabble and labour at the same time. 
   In my view, at this point our analysis requires some more robust elaboration. It is 
true that the variable disorganisation has guided mainstream research on 
marginalisation since the early works of the Chicago School, but it is also true the 
Chicago sociologists themselves were very ambivalent about the concept of 
disorganisation. Their participant observation proved that ‘disorganised’ areas were 
very well organised indeed, based as they were on unwritten codes of conduct guiding 
their material and moral interactions. Similarly, one may remark that the 
contemporary ghetto does not suffer from social disorganisation, but is organised 
differently. In some studies conducted by the Chicago sociologists, it is not the sense 
of isolation and exclusion that the areas studied convey, but rather the opposite: in 
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such areas the licit and the illicit intermingle, both in the economic arena and in the 
political sphere. Think of Landesco’s (1973 [1929]) study of organised crime in 
Chicago, where gangsters have long-standing relations with community leaders in 
athletic clubs, business, the church and politics. Successful inhabitants of the ghetto 
develop ties of mutual interest with the police, politicians and customers for the goods 
and services they supply. Even their violence is the result of such ties, because it is 
used during electoral campaigns and functions as a clandestine, supplementary tool 
deployed by official political parties. The ghetto, therefore, is the strong arm of the 
political apparatus: institutional violence accompanying political campaigning is 
‘contracted out’ to organised criminal groups residing in the ghetto.  
   Returning to the question of ‘ambivalence’, some Chicago scholars failed to 
consider the mixture of legality and illegality within urban territories, treating city 
areas as both morally and physically isolated. Such areas appeared to possess some 
sort of imaginary perimeters isolating delinquents and their delinquency. Other 
Chicago students of marginalised areas, instead, described the activities conducted in 
such areas as incorporating sections of both the official and the hidden labour market. 
Similarly, some contemporary researchers focus on the constant movement of 
individuals who simultaneously inhabit licit and illicit markets and find in both 
opportunities and income (Pearson and Hobbs, 2001; Friman, 2004). I have already 
mentioned the notion of urban bazaars, constituted by a network of retailers, 
ambulatory vendors, distributors, wholesalers, seasonal workers, causal assistants, and 
apprentices, who are all required to possess flexibility and versatile skills. Such 
bazaars also act as informal employment agencies, where people hear of potential job 
opportunities and emerging economic sectors, be they legitimate or otherwise. In 
brief, the metaphor of the bazaar intends to convey an image of city areas as a market-
place, a notion of urban economic activity servicing a diffuse general store, where 
licit consumables, regular pleasures, and illegitimate services are made available 
within the same context (Ruggiero, 2000). 
   The contemporary hyperghetto described by Wacquant seems more immobile: those 
who dwell in it may not be part of a separate group closed in itself, as the author 
explains, nevertheless they do not ‘commute’, as in many other marginalised urban 
areas, between legality and illegality, they just belong ‘to unskilled and socially 
disqualified fractions of the black working class, by virtue of their unstable position at 
the margins of the wage-labour sphere’ (Wacquant, 2008b: 51). Again, note the 
ambivalence: the hyperghetto appears to be a fixed social aggregation, a 
homogeneous marginal settlement, spatially isolated and morally distinctive, but at 
the same time, those who dwell in it do not form a separate group.  
   There is an important issue in recent studies of ‘urban outcasts’ which begs further 
consideration, namely the hypothesis of a double polarisation, from above and from 
below. Polarisation from above connotes the studies of the global, dual city, 
epitomised by the work of Sassen (1991) and Castells (1998), where technological 
development and advanced forms of production coexist with intensive, unskilled, low-
paid work. We may hypothesise that the development of this dual socio-economic 
model is not only accompanied by ‘unification at the top’, that is the establishment of 
a transnational elite, but also by fragmentation at the bottom, what we may term 
polarisation from below. I would interpret this type of fragmentation and polarisation 
as a process creating obsessive individualism, harsh competitiveness and, crucially, 
social and occupational barriers within the ghetto itself. Returning to the metaphor the 
urban bazaar, I would suggest that polarisation from below determines unequal roles 
and careers, so that even in marginalised or illicit economies a principal-agent model 
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prevails. In the ghetto-bazaar the principal commands a number of agents to take 
actions on his/her behalf in exchange for monetary reward. Fragmentation, therefore, 
manifests itself in the form of exploitation and inequality, in a marginal economy 
which reproduces some of the worst aspects of the official economy. Hence the 
plausible remark that there is a ‘scandalous’ similarity between deviance and 
conformity: one of the problems with illegal economies is that in so many ways they 
are, sadly, paradoxical reflections of legal ones. 
 
Self-victimisation 
 
Violence is one of the most vivid expressions of this conformity, and establishes 
barriers and hierarchies within the ghetto itself. Wacquant (2008b: 128) describes a 
climate of ‘perpetual latent mini-guerrilla of the dispossessed among themselves’, 
within a context in which criminality in general is inward-turning and self-destructive.  
Physical danger and insecurity pervade the hyperghetto, but far from being specific 
pathologies of its inhabitants, they are engendered by the ‘penetration and mode of 
regulation of this territory by the state’ (ibid: 54). Internecine violence is analysed as a 
response to various kinds of institutional violence, composed of three elements: mass 
unemployment, relegation in decaying neighbourhoods and stigmatisation for residing 
in such neighbourhoods.   
 
‘Youngsters raised in this environment of pandemic violence suffer serious 
emotional damage and display post-traumatic stress disorders similar to those 
endured by veterans’ (ibid: 56). 
 
There is, however, another aspect to this violence, which is responsive to, as well as 
mimic of, the institutional violence suffered. It is a type of violence learned from the 
official agents who monopolise the use of force, but also an expression of failure, a 
devastating mark of impotence. In my view, the analysis of violence cannot be 
extrapolated from the general context in which ‘violence as a resource’ is distributed 
within a society. Violence producing benefits for perpetrators is normally less visible 
than violence harming perpetrators. In other words, the costs of violence in 
marginalised communities are much higher than elsewhere, and while replicating the 
brutality of law enforcers and other specialists of aggression (the army), violent 
inhabitants of the ghetto are constantly compelled to increase the use of force as a 
consequence of the meagre results this produces for them. It is indeed self-destructive, 
but it is also consistent with specific forms of law enforcement and criminal justice 
practices: if crime cannot be reduced, let us at least make sure that the perpetrator and 
the victim are one and the same. This type of self-victimisation is legible in the end 
result of the violent choice in marginalised settings, where violence or threat of 
violence may temporarily be used as a resource for discouraging competitors and 
establishing territorial and market control, but inevitably leads to ‘early retirement’ 
from crime in the form of imprisonment. We have returned to the notion of the 
carceral social zone, namely an area where the violence suffered and inflicted mimics 
and anticipates the quintessential institutional violence of custody. It is true that 
youngsters brought up in such carceral zone may develop post-traumatic stress 
disorders, but it is also true that all the inhabitants of the ghetto, due to the dire social 
conditions experienced, will learn to substantially lower their expectations. The 
ghetto, therefore, educates its dwellers to devalue themselves and reduce their 
demands, so that those fortunate enough to be employable will accept any job, at any 
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condition. Those who will find work will have assimilated the principles of insecurity 
and internalised their expendability and low monetary value on the labour market, 
while those unemployable will find even in prison a less violent environment than the 
one to which they are inured.  
 
Collective action 
 
It is not surprising that the youths inhabiting excluded communities and ghettoes 
regard the police as an occupying, extraneous, military force. An intimidating 
presence in French working-class banlieus, the police are the main targets of street 
collective violence. This is also the case elsewhere: 
 
‘In the desolate districts of the LA ghetto, the forces of order act as if they 
were waging a trench war with the residents, treating them as an army of 
occupation would its enemies’ (ibid: 32). 
 
Violent responses to such military occupation seem, therefore, triggered by what 
Wacquant terms ‘ethno-racial injustice rooted in discriminatory treatment’. Collective 
violence and riots, we are told, also possess a class logic and manifest a will to rebel 
against widening inequality and deprivation. Direct confrontation with the agents of 
order, lacking other tools and resources, becomes the only available form of 
contestation. Likened to a distorted expression of a lumpen protest, collective street 
violence is seen as a response to the unprecedented violence inflicted on marginal 
communities by ‘the impersonal machineries of the neo-liberal state and the 
deregulated market’.  
   This analysis echoes similar interpretations proposed by conflict theorists in 
sociology, according to whom violent outbursts are nothing but reactive rebellions 
staged by those constantly victimised by law enforcers: in brief, pure responses to 
police harassment and violence. Representatives of this school of thought, during the 
1960s, coined the phrase ‘police riots’ to designate urban violent clashes provoked 
and initiated by the police themselves, who forced youths to use violence in their turn 
as a form of self-defence (Quinney, 1970; 1971). The first problem with this 
interpretation is that it depicts street violence by marginalised groups as pre-political 
conduct, implying that missionaries, vanguards and radical sociologists should unite 
their efforts to try and politicise that conduct. This subtly patronising (or paternalistic) 
logic, in the past, has shown that the only forms of violence with which conflict 
theorists are analytically comfortable are those embryonic forms of social dissent, or 
even those unconscious elements of contention that one could read in conventional 
criminal acts. In this case, at least, radical sociologists can fulfil their mandate by 
unveiling the ‘conscious’ meaning behind such acts. Their role, instead, tends to 
wither away when consciously organised conducts prove that, at times, actors have 
nothing to learn from those interpreting them. In short, radical sociologists are at ease 
when analysing endemic violence caused by structural inequality, institutional racism 
or criminalisation processes, namely a type of violence that they would like to 
marshal in a political project. They become uneasy when actors, through their 
organised violence, delineate their political project (Ruggiero, 2006). The second 
problem with this approach is that it neglects the seductive nature of some forms of 
collective violence, the thrill and the fun that recent analyses recognise in a variety of 
transgressive and deviant acts (Presdee, 2000; Hayward, 2004; Young, 2007; Katz, 
1988).  
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   But does collective action by marginalised groups engender new meanings that open 
up a possible space for collective demands? One may suggest that contemporary 
exclusion (or ‘advanced marginality’) differs from previous forms of urban poverty, 
in that it reflects a broader context of class decomposition rather than class 
consolidation. In such context unification and homogenization amongst marginalised 
subjects is extremely problematic, also because subjects do not hold a clear memory 
of past mobilisation, nor are they familiar with the organisational tools necessary for 
the expression of demands. They are ‘deprived of a language, a repertoire of shared 
images and signs through which to conceive a collective destiny and to project 
possible alternative futures’ (Wacquant, 2008b: 245).  
   This is a crucial point that echoes classical questions posed by collective action 
theorists. Assuming that conflicting interests are a permanent trait of social settings, 
why do these turn into collective action in some contexts and not in others? Behind 
this question lies a fundamental sociological dilemma: do groups always act in their 
common self-interest? Self-interested behaviour is deemed the rule, at least when 
material goods are at stake, and particularly if rational calculus is thought to lead 
choices. According to Olson (1966), unless some types of devises are used, rational 
self-interested individuals and groups will not act to achieve their common interests. 
Action is, therefore, potential, and group-oriented behaviour is latent, until separate 
and selective incentives will stimulate collective action and help formulate demands.  
In this perspective, groups do not, spontaneously and rationally, purse their collective 
goals; rather, they rationally chose to ‘free-ride’, namely to enjoy the benefits of 
collective action while abstaining from participating in it. Many groups, like for 
instance consumers or migrant workers, are not organised, while others, like for 
example unionised labourers and farmers, rely on some degree of organisation. To put 
it in a different way, collective action is not just the result of frustration and 
discontent, but predominantly of strength and capacity to mobilise. Groups need 
‘resources’, that is anything from material things such as income, savings, concrete 
goods and services, to non-material items such as authority, collective memory, an 
established repertoire of action, a symbolic patrimony, moral commitment, trust, skills 
or camaraderie (Ruggiero and Montagna, 2008). It is true that the hyperghetto is a 
‘composite conglomerate, made up of heterogeneous individuals and categories 
negatively defined by social privation, material need and symbolic deficit’. And that 
‘only an immense, specifically political work of aggregation and re-presentation can 
hope to enable this conglomerate to accede to collective existence and thus to 
collective action’ (ibid: 246-7). However, if we accept that mobilisation is a process 
by which an aggrieved group marshals and utilises resources for the pursuit of its 
specific set of goals, we may well define the hyperghetto as a social formation which, 
having been denied resources (and even when producing violent outbursts), is 
incapacitated in producing collective mobilisation. Hyperghettoes are such because, 
by definition, they cannot produce collective action. If this is a central characteristic 
of contemporary ghettoes, the work required to fight against them is immense. Those 
who do not share Wacquant’s pessimism, however, have another option: re-orient 
their work towards the concept of social change. 
    Many criminologists and sociologists, by excluding possibilities for social change, 
end up describing society as static and social acts as facts speaking for themselves. In 
doing so, they omit to consider how their own emotional, cultural and political 
commitments create a framework in which those facts are given meaning. Scholars 
who re-orient their research towards social change, on the contrary, bring their 
subjectivity to bear on their objects of study. Examples of this re-orientation are 
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studies of collective action carried out by victims of violence, rather than studies of 
violent behaviour; of initiatives set up by illicit drugs users, rather than of institutional 
initiatives addressed by other to them; studies of campaigns against corporate 
misconduct, rather than analysis of that conduct; finally, studies of movements against 
the crimes of the powerful, including conventional forms of organised crime, rather 
than studies of those crimes (Santino, 2000). In the urban context, examples include 
the study of collective contentious action for the re-appropriation of space and 
mobility in Los Angeles (Soja, 2010), of how ordinary Americans subvert an unfair 
economy (Dodson, 2009), or of how citizens ‘implement their values and alternatives 
in their experience of daily life, in local communities and in the networks and 
organisations of the movement’. Finally, there arestudies of the ‘creation of 
autonomous spaces where [people] experiment with horizontal networks, alternative 
consumption and participatory processes’ (Pleyers, 2010: 12). This process of re-
focusing would fight what Pareto (1980) described as the ‘instinct for the persistence 
of aggregates’, whereby individuals, and for that matter academic disciplines are 
inclined  
 
to maintain established structures of ideas and action, to continue with familiar 
routines. It is how we cope with the inherent unpredictability of life. Our 
instinct is to make the world seem familiar and therefore more manageable. 
Sociologically, this instinct is the basis of cultures and tradition, of social 
control and social order (Noble, 2000: 110). 
 
   If we accept that by studying one phenomenon we contribute to its evolution, or 
even to its creation, subjective choice of the issues studied becomes paramount. 
Values and subjective beliefs shape reality as well as human action attempting to 
change it. Acknowledging the centrality of subjectivity may lead to the recognition 
that what is real is the mind’s way of interpreting and responding to the flux of 
appearances. This is the conclusion reached, among others, by some historians, who 
claim that there is no contradiction, in their work, between the search for evidence and 
the use of rhetoric. Sources, in their view, are neither wide-open windows, like 
realists and positivists believe, neither walls blocking the gaze: rather, they are very 
much like deforming glasses. ‘The use of desire, without which any research is 
impossible, is not incompatible with the refutations inflicted by the principle of 
reality’ (Ginzburg, 2000: 49). Similarly, sociologists may start identifying dynamics 
and conflicts, rather than static situations, and contribute to create the conditions for 
solutions and change. The subjective choice of a sociological paradigm revolving 
around social change may be deleterious for academic careers in the field of 
criminology and the sociology, but may generate a perception that such change is 
possible and necessary. 
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